Voodoo and the American Political Class
You have to hand it to them -- Their forecasters warn of red ink seas lapping at
toes and maybe knees for a decade or two. q.v.
The balance of payments on current account falls off the cliff. q.v.
The dollar gets trounced, dropping by a third. q.v.
So
what do they do? They just cut taxes anyway, and tell everyone wet feet feel good. When energy shortages
reallocate the wealth from their
constituents' portfolios, they think big and invade Iraq. So
what do they do with it? Nothing. The oil sits there and the conquered
territory slides into anarchy. Pension system going broke? SUVs out of control? Corporate sector rife
with fraud? Bring on the gris-gris.
Would Drilling ANWR Make A Significant Difference to Future Oil Imports?
Roger Blanchard has sent in a report:
President Bush, administrative representatives and some congressional
representatives have expended considerable effort in attempting to open the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas development, ostensibly
to reduce U.S. oil imports. Oil
imports into the U.S. are significant. This year U.S. oil* imports will average ~11.0
million barrels/day (mb/d). To
place 11.0 m b/d in perspective, no other country consumes as much as 6 mb/d.
Quantitatively, how would oil production from ANWR affect future U.S. oil
imports? According to the U.S.
Country Analysis Brief at the U.S. DOE/EIA website, ANWR could produce
1.0-1.35 mb/d at peak production. That
range is based upon a mean technically recoverable amount of oil of 10.3
billion barrels. I would expect
the economically recoverable amount of oil to be less, and possibly
considerably less, but I’ll use 1.3 mb/d for the analysis.
I’ll assume that production would start in 2010 and reach peak
production in 2020 (It took 11 years for the initial North Slope oil
development to reach peak production).
The U.S. DOE/EIA is projecting that U.S. oil consumption will rise 6.1 mb/d
from 2000 to 2020. Subtracting
0.5 mb/d for the approximate consumption increase from 2000 to 2003 leaves a
5.6 mb/d increase from 2003 to 2020. Crude + condensate production from the Lower 48 states,
excluding the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, has declined 5.6 mb/d since 1971.
I’m projecting that it will decline 2.0 mb/d between 2003 and 2020.
Deepwater Gulf of Mexico production is presently rising rapidly but I’m
projecting a peak around 2010. I’m
further projecting that deepwater Gulf of Mexico oil production will be 0.3
mb/d less in 2020 than it is in 2003. The
U.S. DOE/EIA is projecting that oil production from mature Alaskan fields will
decline 0.8 mb/d between 2000 and 2020. Subtracting
0.1 for the decline from 2000 to 2003 leaves 0.7 mb/d for the decline from
2003 to 2020.
Adding the increase in consumption and the decreases in
production, 5.6 + 2.0 + 0.3 + 0.7 mb/d gives 8.6 mb/d.
Subtracting 1.3 mb/d for ANWR oil production leaves 7.3 mb/d.
Based upon this analysis, the U.S. would have to obtain 7.3 mb/d from
somewhere beyond ANWR for oil imports in 2020 to be 11.0 mb/d, the present
value. Because of limited further
oil resources in the U.S., I would expect most or all of the 7.3 mb/d value to
come from imports which would cause imports to rise from 11.0 mb/d at present
to as much as 18.3 mb/d in 2020.
All projections are incorrect to some degree.
The assumed increase in U.S. oil demand is based upon the belief that
global production can continue to increase to meet demand.
I’m skeptical of that but time will tell.
I am certain that even if oil development occurs in ANWR, U.S. oil
imports will continue to rise.
*For this note, oil includes crude oil,
condensate, natural gas liquids, refined products and refinery gain
Natural Gas (3) - Greenspan Begins to Understand
There are few signs at the moment that anyone in the administration
understands the seriousness of the natural gas situation (beyond EIA's
short-term forecasters).* However, the Fed Chairman is beginning to catch
on:
... In contrast, prices for natural gas have increased sharply in response
to very tight supplies. Working gas in storage is presently at extremely low
levels, and the normal seasonal rebuilding of these inventories seems to be
behind the typical schedule. The colder-than-average winter played a role in
producing today’s tight supply situation as did the inability of heightened
gas well drilling to significantly augment net marketed production. Canada,
our major source of gas imports, has little room to expand shipments to the
United States. Our limited capacity to import liquified [sic] natural gas
effectively restricts our access to the world’s abundant supplies of natural
gas. The current tight domestic natural gas market reflects the increases in
demand over the past two decades. That demand has been spurred by myriad new
uses for natural gas in industry and by the increased use of natural gas as a
clean-burning source of electric power. ... q.v.
*Pete could be wrong about this. q.v.
Natural Gas (2) - Fundamental Source of the Problem
It is common to assume that because of improvements in imaging technology and
directional drilling capabilities, the natural gas production industry will be
able to continue to produce an ever increasing amount from what is generally
thought to be an abundant resource. The chart of decline curves below doesn't necessarily
contradict those assumptions but it does suggest that the level of drilling
required to stay even is getting bigger all the time as more and more reserves
are tapped and then used up relatively quickly:
Copyright EOG
Resources. Used by permission. By way of contrast, for a representative
taste of the all-is-hunky-dory view see the AGA's Fueling the Future q.v.
Natural Gas (1) -- Warning: Risky Times Ahead
According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "As a
result of recent discoveries of reactor vessel head degradation in Davis
Besse Nuclear Power Station's reactor pressure vessel head, the NRC is
investigating the structural integrity of reactor vessel heads at 69
pressurized water reactors (PWRs)." q.v.
The implications of the NRC story are really chilling: if the system has to turn
off a number of nukes for unscheduled maintenance and replace them with
gas-fired electricity, we'll never be able to set aside the already record
amount of gas required to be in storage by next October. With natural gas
storage already abnormally low, a widespread problem in the nuclear sector could
have extremely serious consequences for next winter.*
Pete was reluctant to publish anything on the gas storage problem because it
can seem irresponsible to warn readers of a dangerous situation and then have
nothing happen. Ultimately, the severity of any problems depend on the weather,
and no one can predict that months before the fact. A change in the weather of
the 2000/2001 winter saved us from another unusual storage drawdown situation
that had developed. The same thing may happen again, and of course Pete is
the first to hope the summer is cooler than usual, and the winter warmer, and
that boric acid hasn't been eating holes in reactor vessel heads. But watch out
if this isn't the case, especially if gas has to be used to replace one or more
nukes.
Here is what Pete wrote more than six weeks ago. q.v.
There are a number of points that could be made to update what's in the
paper. First of all, there are more encouraging signs now that the gas
production industry is working harder to address the need for more supplies, and there are a few new pipeline connections opening up that
Pete hadn't known about and which may alleviate the situation somewhat.
Finally, EIA has changed its views to recognize the possibility of a shortages
and price spikes to offset them. q.v.
Still, with any kind of sustained problem in the nuclear sector, the situation
could get much worse.
Working Gas in
Underground Storage Compared with 5-Year Range
EIA estimates as of May 9,2003, Source: EIA.
For Pete, the only issue is whether the system can get back over 3 Tcf by November.
*Graham
Cowan was good enough to provide some perspective: "One reason they can
put B(OH)3 in some reactors' water is the same reason people can, as some do,
put it in their eyes: it's not very corrosive. But the water in the reactors is
hot, up to around 600 K, versus 310 K for the eyes, and at that sort of
temperature boric acid in water solution can attack some kinds of steel.
Evidently the inner surface of the Davis-Besse reactor's pressure vessel, and I
guess of any pressurized water reactor, is not any of those kinds. But its
*outer* surface, and most of its thickness, is, and there are holes for control
rods and instruments, and seepage through one of these allowed aqueous boric
acid to pit the vessel from the outside in, all the way to the stainless steel
liner. If that liner had been more susceptible, it might have sprung a
leak before plant personnel, along about March 2002 if I recall correctly,
discovered all the junk on the outside -- which was quite a long time later than
it might have been, I understand. Such a leak would not have been catastrophic;
much attention has been paid to planning how to deal with leaks, even very large
ones, not newborn corrosion pinholes. So we can be certain boric acid won't one
morning demolish all the PWRs, or even one. But it, along with inattention to
seepage, has put one, Davis-Besse, out of action for many months, and evoked a
heightened state of alertness to seepage throughout the industry; hence the
South Texas reactor shutdown, on whose vessel's underside a boric acid crust
about a million times smaller than the one at D-B turned up. "
How Do Changes in Energy Prices Affect Demand? (1)
Easy, you say. When energy prices spike upward, aggregate demand deteriorates
rapidly, and vice versa. Econ 101. Right? Well maybe it's a bit more complicated
than you thought. Andrew McKillop writes from the UK with his analysis:*
Conventional or received wisdom,
embodied in the notion of ‘price elasticity’ of demand, is that large oil
price rises will necessarily reduce economic growth and oil demand growth
rates, perhaps resulting in zero economic growth, or recession, and producing
a contraction of world oil demand on a year-by-year basis. The higher the rise
of oil prices, the faster it is assumed that ‘price elastic’ responses
will play. Higher oil prices will “of course” reduce economic growth,
generate stock exchange panics and produce inflation, leading to monetary and
financial instability; higher interest rates, and even a plunge into recession
will be needed to combat this menace through intensifying the fall in economic
growth rates “inevitably caused” by higher oil prices, thus cutting world
oil demand. [continued]
*Author's postscript:
In my article that you kindly published, it ends like this:... Depending on
oil price rises, and certainly with price levels of up to $50 - $60/barrel,
composite or aggregate world economic growth rates are more likely to grow, than
to shrink. In such case, overall world oil demand growth rates may well break
out of the 'long term trend rate', that is used by OECD agencies such as the IEA
to forecast future demand, and attain levels of considerably above 2%/year
(perhaps 2%-2.25% per year with prices at $50-$60/barrel).
Today I saw this information: "ENERGY
MATTERS: Mayday! distress call from US May data / Posted: Thursday, June 05,
2003 /By: PETROLEUMWORLD: US oil demand in May set a record for the month, at
20.081 million bpd, following on from an April demand record and first-quarter
demand which was at the highest level in 24 years. Demand was up 2% from a year
ago and is averaging a 2.9% gain through the first five months of the
year.
Now I am the first to accept there are all kinds of technical and other factors in play (but mostly price related) like fuel switching
away from natural gas, but the oil price rise impact on demand trends is rather
well demonstrated by these real world numbers for the US energy economy.
Why Does California Have to Pay So Much More?
It's not a simple problem and EIA's culprit for the most recent spikes -- the
phase out of MTBE in favor of ethanol and back luck in refinery outage
scheduling -- may not seem fully satisfactory. q.v.
Exxon's Results Are Off The Charts
First Quarter
2003 2002
Net Income
$ Millions 7,040 2,090
$ Per Common Share
Assuming Dilution 1.05 0.30
Earnings Excluding Merger Effects,
Discontinued Operations, Accounting
Change and Other Special Items
$ Millions 4,790 2,123
$ Per Common Share
Assuming Dilution 0.71 0.30
Revenue - $ Millions 63,780 43,393
Capital & Exploration
Expenditures - $ Millions 3,496 2,974
It's no one's fault that the oil markets went berserk in the first quarter,
thinks
Pete. What do you expect when the Nigerians, Venezuelans, Iraqis, and
Americans all go extreme simultaneously? The rest of the world may need to
keep a few more tranquilizer darts on hand in case it ever happens again.
Certainly Exxon's management can't claim much credit, except maybe for holding
on tight during a wild ride.
BP Posts Record Results
Even though Pete has no idea what the caveat means, BP's warns that "the
pro forma result, adjusted for special items, has been derived from the group’s
reported UK GAAP accounting information but is not in itself a recognized UK or
US GAAP measure." Whatever that may mean, and assuming replacement cost
profits are artfully reduced versions of good old profits, here are BP's
results:
1Q
2003
1Q 4Q 1Q vs.1Q
$ million 2003 2002 2002 2002
==========================
Replacement cost profit before exceptional items 3,128 1,697 924
Special items(a) (27) 416 120
Acquisition amortization(b) 628 522 538
--------------------------
Pro forma result adjusted for special items 3,729 2,635 1,582 136%
==========================
- per ordinary share (pence) 10.44 7.61 4.94
- per ordinary share (cents) 16.70 11.78 7.06 137%
- per ADS (dollars) 1.00 0.71 0.42
==========================
- BP’s first quarter pro forma result, adjusted for special items, was a
record $3,729 million compared with $1,582 million a year ago, an increase
of 136%.
Perhaps the good old profits were embarrassingly large. Rest of the news
release q.v.
Running Iraq
Suppose you had been appointed the petroleum
specialist on General Garner's staff and were trying to figure out what to do
with the largely intact remnants of the Iraqi oil industry. You'd first
have to make sure enough crude got to the functioning refineries to give the
locals the chance to heat food, get to work, and so forth. That's in the process
of being done. What then? You'd obviously be well advised not to think that you
were running the show: that your elders and betters back in Washington were
going to let you know what do next. Rumsfeld's instruction would almost
certainly be full steam ahead -- pump all you can and get it to the world market
as soon as possible. Except there is the little matter of the economic sanctions
still very much in place legally. Changed circumstances, you'd be
told. But shouldn't the UN at least be given the chance to remove them?
We'll handle that one would come the reply. Okay, oil exports start flowing big
time. Your accountants start transferring out the funds needed to pay the
victorious army for reconstruction costs. You take a phone call from the OPEC
secretary general who reminds you that Iraq is a founding member of the cartel
and sworn to keep to its production quota, now down near zero. That was then,
this is now, you'd tell him. You next take a call from either Paris or Moscow
and speak with the chair of the Iraqi creditors committee, who'd remind you
about certain bills that are very much past due, that you have no legal title to
the oil, and, regrettably, at each port
ready to receive your tankers legal actions had been brought seizing the oil.
Your riposte would be something along the lines of do you know who you're
dealing with here. And their demurrer would be to tell it to the judge.
Pete thinks that judge, or whoever must sort the whole thing out, is going to
earn his or her pay.*
*Robert Ehrlich suggests a
more down to earth approach: "Well if I were the technocrat involved, I
would offer big hiring bonuses to all of the Iraqi petroleum engineers and
geologists who are working everywhere from the U.S. to Libya to Saudi Arabia.
Those whom I have met have been top-notch. Then have them recommend the best
hardware and software, etc. to get the ball rolling. That is, let them be the
buffer between Iraq and the Halliburtons, Schlumbergers, etc. "
On the Saudis
Randy Udall wrote some time ago suggesting that the cover piece
on the Saudis in the current Atlantic was worth reading.* It took Pete an unreasonably
long time to find it, but here are several representative passages that at least
give the flavor of the thing:
... Saudi Arabia today is a mess, and it is our mess. We made
it the private storage tank for our oil reserves. We reaped the benefits
of a steady petroleum supply at a discounted price, and we grabbed at every
available Saudi petrodollar. ... We cannot walk away morally from the
consequences of this behavior -- and we really can't walk away
economically. So we crow about democracy and talk about weaning
ourselves from our dependence on foreign oil, despite the fact that as long as
America has been dependent on foreign oil there has never been an honest,
sustained effort at the senior governmental level to reduce long-term U.S.
petroleum consumption. ... Signs of impending disaster are everywhere, but the
House of Saud has chosen to pray that the moment of reckoning will not come
soon -- and the United States has chosen to look away. So nothing changes ...
But sometime soon, one way or another, the House of Saud is coming down. ("The
Fall of the House of Saud" Atlantic Monthly, May, 2003)
As always, it is much better to read the original because Pete's
ellipses leave out a lot of good stuff. Mark you, Pete neither likes nor
dislikes the Saudis per se, and thinks everyone should be grateful they provided
the extra oil that helped get us through the recent crisis without too much
economic damage.
*Randy Udall also recommends High and Mighty:
The World's Most Dangerous Vehicles and How They Came to Be That Way... by
Keith Bradsher. It explains "how automakers (in collusion with federal
regulators and politicians) have driven 20 million SUVs through the light truck
loophole created by CAFE way back when. It's also a reality check for those who
believe that fuel-efficient hybrid electric vehicles will be dominant anytime
soon." Perhaps had the US political class been more responsible we
wouldn't have to shudder at the thought of the fall of the house of Saud and the
shadow it casts on all those SUVs.
League Tables
|
Top
World Oil Net Exporters, 2002
|
|
Country
|
Net
Exports (million barrels per day) |
|
1) |
Saudi
Arabia |
6.76 |
|
2) |
Russia |
5.03 |
|
3) |
Norway |
3.14 |
|
4) |
Iran |
2.30 |
|
5) |
Venezuela |
2.26 |
|
6) |
United
Arab Emirates |
1.95 |
|
7) |
Nigeria |
1.85 |
|
8) |
Kuwait |
1.73 |
|
9) |
Mexico |
1.69 |
|
10) |
Iraq |
1.58 |
|
11) |
Algeria |
1.27 |
|
12) |
Libya |
1.16 |
U.S.
Net Petroleum Imports, 2002
|
|
Country
|
Total
Net Oil Imports (million barrels
per day) |
|
Canada
|
1.83 |
|
Saudi Arabia
|
1.55 |
| Venezuela |
1.37 |
| Mexico |
1.28 |
| Nigeria |
0.60 |
| United Kingdom |
0.47 |
| Iraq |
0.44 |
| Norway |
0.38 |
| Angola |
0.33 |
| Net Imports |
10.38 |
Source: EIA
Quick Recap: Why the Middle East Matters
EIA has published the rest of the story. q.v.
Uninterrupted Progress
(Millions
of barrels per day)
Looking at the larger picture, it is extraordinary how the
world's oil industry has been able to meet sustained increases in petroleum
demand, despite major political upheavals like the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps it is no less remarkable that the world's political leaders seem to
think their petroleum suppliers will be able to do so indefinitely. There is
good reason to suppose the next third of a century will present more
difficulties than the last.
China and Oil Imports
Roger Blanchard has sent in a report on Chinese oil imports:
People in China appear to want to live the Chinese dream,
which parallels the American dream. The
American dream involves consuming large quantities of fossil fuels, most notably
oil. China is rapidly increasing
its use of oil as well. Because of
limited Chinese oil resources, Chinese oil imports have risen rapidly in recent
years. The figure shows Chinese production and consumption.
| |
Chinese Oil Production and
Consumption |
| |
 |
| |
Red = production; green = consumption |
China started importing oil in 1993.
In 2002, Chinese imports were 35.9% of consumption.
If the rate that Chinese imports have increased since 1993 continues,
imports will be 50% of consumption in 4 years.
Increasing conflict in coming years between the U.S. and China over
Middle East oil resources seems likely as both countries import increasing
volumes of oil from the Middle East.
EIA and Prices
Anyone who reads this page regularly will have noticed that Pete filches a
large portion of his stuff from EIA. They may also have noticed a certain
deference, bordering on servility, in Pete's attitude toward the hard-working,
multi-talented lot who season after season churn out energy statistical reality.
The problem is that not all observers are quite so favorably impressed when EIA
lifts its forecasting finger to the wind. Take Steve Andrews, who writes
It's interesting to note that EIA thinks this will be an
all-time high year for natural gas prices. No surprise to you or me or
visitors to Policy Pete's PP&G, but just 18 months ago, they projected
that natural gas prices were back in their regular ol' saddle and would
reside there for the foreseeable future. Their bad.
In fact, EIA is so bad at energy price prognostication that I wonder why
they bother. I think they have the historic record for being wrong. My
favorite piece of dartboard material to this end is a clip from the Denver
Post (Dec 3, 1998) in which Jay Hakes, then-head of EIA, projected oil prices
at $14/barrel for 2000 (actual was $29) and below-$20 oil out through
2007...all because of the "Asian economic flu" that lasted from
mid-1997 through the writing of that ill-fated prognostication. A close second
place for the wrongo energy price award would be The Economist, with their
headline of March 6, 1999 entitled "Drowning in Oil." They wrote
that oil might bottom at $5/barrel. Indeed. Some day when one of your readers
is bored and has nothing but time on their hands, they
could go back through old issues of Oil & Gas Journal and document EIA
farcical price myopia. Too bad people in decision-making positions actually
listen to those fellas."
Harsh. Anyone from EIA have a reply?*
*Nothing from EIA yet but Dave Westenbarger wrote from Texas
to suggest, "Maybe the geologists will agree to quit forecasting prices if
the economists will agree to quit forecasting reserves. Sound fair?"
Sounds fair to Pete.
Oil Production, Ghawar, and the Hubbert Peak
This is a complex topic, fraught with uncertainties.* Jeffrey Brown has
been good enough to send in a report:
Since 1970, world
oil production (crude plus condensate) has dropped in consecutive back-to-back
years only twice -- from 1981 to 1983 and from 2000 to 2002.
The 1981 to 1983 drop was because of a huge drop in Saudi Arabia's production
of 4.8 million barrels per day--almost a 50% cut. World oil production fell by
2.8 million b/d over this time period. If it were not for the huge Saudi
cut, world oil production would have risen by 2.5 million b/d.
Saudi Arabia's production did drop from 2000 to 2002, but only by 800,000 b/d,
while world oil production fell by 1.3 million b/d. Even if Saudi
Arabia's production had not fallen, world oil production would have still
fallen by 500,000 b/d. In other words, this is the ONLY time in the past
32 years that a back-to-back drop in annual world oil production has not been
exclusively due to a voluntary cutback by Saudi Arabia.
In any case, one very important question is whether the 2000 to 2002 cutback
by the Saudis was truly "voluntary." The water cut in the Ghawar
Field (the largest oil field in the world) has been steadily increasing, and
the Saudis may be cutting back production to avoid damage to the reservoir.
Following is an excerpt from a 2000 EIA report on Saudi Arabia (emphasis
added), "As Shaybah light crude production increases (to 500,000 b/d),
Saudi Arabia likely will CUT production of Arab Light from overworked parts
(water content is rising) of the Ghawar reservoir, as well as Arab Heavy from
offshore."
The key point is that this drop in production from 2000 to 2002 corresponds
precisely to King Hubbert's
predicted peak for world oil production.
On the issue of
Ghawar, the following comment was received from Ken Ainsworth of
Continental Resources:
I found your observations on the
Saudi cutback to Ghawar Field interesting, particularly in light of an
observation I made at a conference in the fall. At that time, Aramco put on a
half-day session dedicated entirely to the geotechnical aspects of the field.
Most of the papers were of the propeller-head variety of interest to only such
as myself, and the Aramco folks were extremely tight-lipped about their
projections of future recoverable reserves and deliverability. But in the course
of the presentations, they did show a series of maps illustrating the current
oil-water contact of the primary producing zone, as well as the original
contact. Strictly as a qualitative observation, it looked as though a good half
the productive area has been swept. When placed in the context that a
significant part of the field still above water is in what the Aramco folks
themselves described as "poorer quality reservoir", I would say that
this is not a field that will provide unlimited oil for future generations. Your
thoughts appear to be right on target.
*Pete doesn't know whether or not
Jeffery Brown is right or not about reaching the peak, and suspects it's the
kind of thing you could only 'know' in retrospect.
Record Real Natural Gas Prices
While everyone else has been focused on the ups and downs of the world oil
price, Pete's been watching natural gas prices. Unlike oil prices, which are
high in nominal but not real terms, gas prices are high any way you look at
them, even though last winter's spike has now abated. EIA is expecting
2003 to be the all-time record.
Perhaps you think things have gotten out of hand, that the
economic recovery is being choked by these price levels, and that gas prices
ought to start falling soon. Au contraire. You should be glad prices are
high and you should hope they stay that way, because its going to take every
resource the gas production industry can muster to get us through next
winter. But that's another story....
Democrats and Energy Policy
Energy
is one policy the Democrats never get right. For twenty years they've believed
there is no problem, that whatever the symptom of the day might be, it was
produced by a conspiracy between Republicans and the oil industry. And
whatever the symptom, the Democrats have believed it to have been trumped by
environmental considerations. Ironically, they produced the only president in
the post-WWII period, Carter, who advanced a coherent, comprehensive energy policy, but then
fought him all the way, encouraging Ted Kennedy to run against him and thereby
ensure his defeat by Reagan.
Ever since, the Democratic Party leadership has hummed a mantra of
conservation and alternative fuels with cynical abandon, knowing full well that
neither could ever provide a realistic basis for a modern economy. Now,
faced with a real environmental problem with extremely serious consequences,
global climate change, they have once again proven unable to think their way out
of the box Clinton left them in. A recent instance of the cynical game
came from Senator Boxer. Her analysis of drilling a strip of the Alaska
National Wildlife Refuge: the US could get the same benefit "by just
getting the SUVs to have the same fuel economy as autos." q.v.
This is quite true and would, in theory, be a major advance. But do the
Democrats really want to accomplish it? Of course not, it's neither politically
expedient nor physically possible, unless one redefines what an SUV is. Take
another example, also from Senator Boxer, "After seeing the statistics, I
don't buy the argument that higher gasoline prices are due to higher crude oil
prices. That is what oil companies are saying, but financial records suggest
that oil companies have been pocketing more profits as consumers pay record high
gas prices." q.v.
It would be nice if that one were true too, because it's easy enough to
investigate and stop if confirmed. But once again, all it has going for it
is that it sounds good, which is what the current crop of Democrat leaders
almost invariably are willing to settle for.
Who Imports Iraqi Oil?
Many Americans
appear to believe that the UN security council refused to approve the US
invasion of Iraq because France and Germany are dependent on Iraqi oil.
Here's the most recent data.
|
Oil
Imports into OECD Countries |
|
OECD Europe
Total
|
|
United
States |
|
(2002
Daily Average) |
OECD
Total |
France |
Germany |
|
Total
Net Imports |
23.586 |
7.950 |
1.857 |
2.506 |
10.378 |
|
Total
Gross Imports |
39.719 |
17.796 |
2.238 |
2.916 |
11.358 |
|
Gross
Imports from OPEC4 |
16.478 |
4.766 |
0.713 |
0.446 |
4.558 |
|
Gross
Imports from Persian Gulf5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
10.546 |
2.311 |
|
available to the markets: it was several layers deeper into the onion than the
aggregate recap required by a 10K or 10Q. No one really knows what it was
for but it probably had something to do with ensuring they didn't benefit from
anti-competitive practices as they danced, not always at arm's length, with
OPEC. But that was before four of the sisters ate the other three. 
